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Psychiatric disorders present distinct clinical challenges which are partly attributable to their multifactorial aetiology
and the absence of laboratory tests that can be used to confirm diagnosis or predict risk. Psychiatric disorders are
highly heritable, but also polygenic, with genetic risk conferred by interactions between thousands of variants of
small effect that can be summarized in a polygenic risk score. We discuss four areas in which the use of polygenic
risk scores in psychiatric research and clinical contexts could have ethical implications. First, there is concern that
clinical use of polygenic risk scores may exacerbate existing health inequities. Second, research findings regarding
polygenic risk could be misinterpreted in stigmatising or discriminatory ways. Third, there are concerns associated
with testing minors as well as eugenics concerns elicited by prenatal polygenic risk testing. Fourth, potential
challenges that could arise with the feedback and interpretation of high polygenic risk for a psychiatric disorder
would require consideration. While there would be extensive overlap with the challenges of feeding back genetic
findings in general, the potential clinical use of polygenic risk scoring warrants discussion in its own right, given the
recency of this possibility. To this end, we discuss how lay interpretations of risk and genetic information could
intersect. Consideration of these factors would be necessary for ensuring effective and constructive communication
and interpretation of polygenic risk information which, in turn, could have implications for the uptake of any
therapeutic recommendations. Recent advances in polygenic risk scoring have major implications for its clinical
potential, however, care should be taken to ensure that communication of polygenic risk does not feed into
problematic assumptions regarding mental disorders or support reductive interpretations.
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Complex riskBackground
Psychiatric disorders present distinct clinical challenges
due to the fact that their diagnosis relies predominantly
on observing a patient’s behaviour and on their reporting
symptoms rather than on clinical tests for biomarkers.
This is mostly attributable to the sheer complexity of
psychiatric disorders which are heterogeneous in both
aetiology and symptomology. For this reason, establish-
ing evidence of pathophysiological functioning through
identifying definitive biomarkers that could assist in
more efficient risk identification, diagnosis and prognosis* Correspondence: andrea.palk@uct.ac.za
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has been a major research imperative for a number of
decades. Given advances in our understanding of the
genetic basis of psychiatric disorders, the question arises
whether metrics that describe these, such as the poly-
genic risk score (PRS), could be used as biomarkers.
PRS is a research tool that is currently used in a range
of genetic studies. PRS is calculated by multiplying the
number of independent risk alleles an individual carries
by the effect size of each variant, then summing these
products across variants. While PRS currently lacks pre-
dictive power and may never possess clinical utility for
certain psychiatric disorders, for disorders with high her-
itability such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, there
is a growing possibility that some form of PRS may bele is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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while to consider any ethical implications of such a test.
In the first part of this paper we provide an outline of
some of the relevant scientific and methodological chal-
lenges and introduce PRS. In the second part we discuss
four areas in which the use of polygenic risk scores in
psychiatric research and clinical contexts could have eth-
ical implications with a particular focus on potential
challenges that could arise with the feedback and inter-
pretation of high polygenic risk for a psychiatric dis-
order. While there would be much overlap with the
challenges associated with the feedback of genetic find-
ings in general, we mainly focus on the potential difficul-
ties associated with communicating and interpreting
complex genetic risk information. To this end, we look
at how lay interpretations of risk and genetic informa-
tion could intersect. Consideration of these factors
would be necessary to ensure effective and constructive
communication and interpretation of polygenic risk in-
formation which, in turn, could have implications for
the uptake of any therapeutic recommendations. Recent
advances with PRS have major implications for its clin-
ical potential, however, care should be taken to ensure
that interpretation of polygenic risk does not feed into
problematic assumptions regarding mental disorders or
support reductive interpretations.
Genetic markers for psychiatric disorders
There is considerable interest in identifying the genetic
determinants of psychiatric disorders. Collaborations like
the Psychiatric Genetics Consortium (PGC) have played
a key role in delineating the role of genetic variants in
conferring risk for major psychiatric disorders such as
schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorders, bipolar dis-
order, major depressive disorder and attention deficit
and hyperactivity disorder [1]. However, as advances
have been made in this area, the sheer complexity of the
genetic underpinnings of these disorders has also
become increasingly apparent. As is true in the case of
many other complex diseases (e.g. diabetes mellitus,
hypertension, coronary heart disease and some cancers),
the vast majority of psychiatric disorders are highly poly-
genic, with thousands of independent genetic associa-
tions of small effect contributing meaningfully to risk. In
contrast, rare monogenic or Mendelian disorders such
as Fragile X or Noonan syndrome account for a minority
of psychiatric disorders and are caused by single gene
mutations. In addition, psychiatric disorders, and com-
plex illnesses in general, are multifactorial; risk is con-
ferred not only by additive genetic effects but also by
non-genetic, environmental interactions. Further com-
plexity is due to considerable overlap in the genetic basis
of different psychiatric disorders. For example, an indi-
vidual at risk for developing schizophrenia will also be atrisk for bipolar disorder [2]. This overlap presents chal-
lenges for the coherence of current psychiatric nosology
which, for diagnostic purposes, entails categorising dis-
orders as discrete entities [3].
Despite these challenges, the rapid progress in the field
of genetics, and related areas, coupled with greater spe-
cificity due to ever-increasing sample sizes, gives cause
for optimism that the clinical utility (i.e. the ability to
demonstrate “user acceptability and accuracy”, as well as
improving “clinical decision making…[and] clinical out-
comes” [4]) of genetic markers in psychiatry may be
imminent. As our knowledge of the genetic basis of psy-
chiatric disorders develops, it could also support a more
targeted therapeutic approach for psychiatric disorders,
known as precision medicine (PM) [5]. PM entails tailor-
ing clinical decisions according to an individual’s bio-
logical and relevant environmental factors that impact
disease outcomes, in order to maximise treatment efficacy
and minimise adverse side-effects. This move towards a
more personalised approach to treatment has been in-
formed by the major costs associated with suboptimal
treatment and adverse drug reactions [6]. While there are
a number of factors that contribute to adverse drug reac-
tions, in many cases the genetic profile of the patient is
implicated in negative side effects [7].
Genome-wide association studies and polygenic risk
scores
One of the primary ways in which our understanding of
complex traits has been expanded over the last decade is
through genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and,
more recently, through whole exome sequencing studies
(WES). Both of these involve experimental designs that
explore genetic variation at the population level in order
to delineate genetic contributions to disease risk and
prediction with the ultimate aim of treating or, if
possible, preventing complex diseases [8]. The power of
such studies to robustly identify associations between
genetic variants and traits, and thus, to accurately pre-
dict disease risk depends primarily on sample size [8].
To achieve statistical significance, such studies require
large numbers of samples of both cases and controls.1
The logistical difficulties involved in obtaining such
vast numbers of samples have led to the introduction of
meta-analysis, which combines results from smaller
studies. To this end, genomics research is frequently
conducted in large consortia involving collaboration on
an international scale between numerous sites. An ex-
ample, mentioned above, is the PGC which was created
in 2007 with the aim of conducting meta-analyses to
deepen existing knowledge of the aetiology of psychiatric
disorders. One of their key findings has been the identi-
fication of 108 schizophrenia-associated genetic loci, in-
dicating that risk is conferred by thousands of common
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tiple GWASs, the PGC has also advanced the use of
polygenic risk scoring for psychiatric disorders [2].
PRS is a statistical tool that is used in research to predict
genetic risk for complex diseases. A PRS can be calculated
using summary statistics from a GWAS “discovery” sam-
ple in which millions of single-nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs)2 have been scanned in order to identify those al-
leles that distinguish cases from controls in the particular
phenotypic trait or disease that is being studied. The set of
SNPs that has been identified in the discovery GWAS
generally comprises thousands of risk alleles of small ef-
fect. This genomic information from the discovery sample
is then used to calculate the PRS of each individual in an
independent “target” sample [10]. The most common way
of calculating a PRS is to sum the number of risk alleles
that an individual possesses multiplied by the trait-specific
weight as reported by the discovery dataset [11]. The
generated PRS would essentially inform of the degree of
genetic risk an individual has for developing the disease
in question.
Clinical potential
PRS is currently limited to research contexts where it is
used for various purposes such as testing treatment modal-
ities and predicting treatment outcomes, testing associa-
tions between traits and/or diseases, and determining
genetic overlap between disorders (see [12–16]). However,
the possibility of adapting PRS for clinical use in psychiatry
is something that is now being considered [17–19]. This is
not surprising given the polygenicity and heritability of
psychiatric disorders as well as the difficulties associated
with their diagnosis and treatment, and thus, the dire need
for legitimate biomarkers. In fact, PRS may arguably be
able to aid differential diagnosis. Recently PRS was able to
identify both shared genetic components as well as genetic
differences between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder for
the first time [20]. In cases where a patient’s symptoms fit
multiple disorders, greater diagnostic precision would en-
able a more accurate understanding of disease course and
treatment (see [20] for a full discussion of the implications
of this possibility). Indeed, this raises the question of how
PRS would be used in a clinical setting.
In order to facilitate understanding and use, PRS is
generally converted into a standardised score that fol-
lows a normal distribution, with higher PRS correspond-
ing to higher risk [17]. In the clinical context, PRS could
be used to determine an individual’s position on this dis-
tribution so that those whose scores fall above a suffi-
ciently high, predefined threshold would be informed of
this risk. It is unclear how extreme a score would have
to be to achieve clinical relevance, however it could be
speculated that a PRS in the top 1–5% of the population
would warrant feedback [17].In their brief paper exploring the possibility of trans-
lating PRS into a clinical context, Lewis and Vassos dis-
cuss potential advantages [17]. First, calculating a PRS is
relatively straightforward and requires only a DNA sam-
ple. Second, DNA is stable from birth, and as sample
sizes in genetic studies increase, PRS will continue to be-
come more accurate. Third, and most importantly,
knowing that one is at high risk for developing a dis-
order well in advance of onset could enable pre-emptive
treatment or the avoidance of environmental stressors
that could trigger onset, thereby enabling possible pre-
vention or mitigation of the disorder [17].
PRS could, for example, be particularly useful for busy
primary care doctors, as a tool to screen patients who are
at risk. Help in the early identification of, say, subtle pro-
dromal symptoms of schizophrenia, could ensure that
such patients are referred to specialist care more swiftly.
The question of when, and how, to treat patients at high
risk is a challenging one, given the fact that it is only pos-
sible to identify the prodromal period retrospectively, i.e.
once the disease has progressed [21]. Pre-emptive treat-
ment of patients with prodromal schizophrenia has, how-
ever, been associated with improved clinical outcomes in
various studies [22]. An example of such treatment is ad-
ministration of low doses of antipsychotics (e.g. risperi-
done) in conjunction with psychotherapy (e.g. cognitive
behavioural therapy) [23, 24].
The greater precision of risk identification afforded by
PRS could be useful not only at a clinical level, if it is
able to improve patient outcomes, but also at a public
health level as a means of developing intervention
thresholds, or in terms of resource-allocation. The po-
tential of PRS to be used in such a way could be assessed
through, for example, an evidence-based initiative offer-
ing phase-specific psychosocial treatments to people at
very high risk for developing schizophrenia, where high
risk is defined by PRS. In this context, determining a
specific numeric threshold, above which treatments were
associated with better outcomes, would be useful.3
Challenges to clinical translation
Despite the promise that PRS holds, there are certain
technical barriers that currently prevent its clinical
translation, the largest of which is discussed next. PRSs
are currently able to explain between 1 and 15% of the
variation between cases and controls in research con-
texts [8]. This has been regarded as insufficient predict-
ive ability to allow robust translation into a clinical
context [25, 26]. However, the utility of being able to ex-
plain 15% of risk for a disorder, in the entire population,
must also not be underestimated. For an individual at
the top end of the risk distribution, the relative risk will
be significantly higher than 15% increased risk. Individ-
uals at the top end of the distribution may be at three to
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certain diseases, with even higher relative risk for disor-
ders such as schizophrenia [18]. This information has
major relevance from the perspective of prevention and
treatment. In fact, it has been argued that PRS is already
more useful for identifying a larger patient population at
risk for common disorders, than some monogenic tests
for rare disorders which are currently used in the clinical
context [18].
The limited variation explained by PRS is largely attrib-
utable to what has been coined the problem of ‘missing
heritability’. A disorder such as schizophrenia is estimated
to be approximately 80% heritable, with heritability refer-
ring to the proportion of the phenotypic variation that is
attributable to genetic variation. However, depending on
the measure used, the highest proportion of variation that
has thus far been captured by PRS for a psychiatric dis-
order is 7% on the liability scale for schizophrenia [9].
There are several possibilities regarding these ‘missing
genes’ [27]. While it has been estimated that common var-
iants may explain up to half the heritability for numerous
common diseases, many common risk variants may have
even smaller effects that will only be detected with suffi-
ciently large sample sizes [28]. Furthermore, it has been
confirmed that risk is conferred by common and rare (de
novo) variants acting additively in the case of autism
spectrum disorders [29], this may also be the case for
other disorders. There is also the possibility that unknown
non-additive4 genetic variation could be a component of
genetic liability [30]. As GWAS sample sizes increase, the
predictive power and efficacy of PRS also increases [8].
However, despite the allure of a tool such as the PRS, its
translational potential needs to be empirically evaluated.
Furthermore, there are potential ethical concerns regard-
ing the use of PRS in research and clinical contexts.
Ethical concerns
Genetic counselling for psychiatric disorders is generally
limited to cases where there is an established family his-
tory of a disorder, such as schizophrenia, or a known
risk of dominant or recessive inheritance of diseases as-
sociated with intellectual or psychiatric impairment or
disability. This is likely to change with increasing public
awareness of the strong hereditary component of psychi-
atric disorders [31] and uptake of direct-to-consumer
genetic testing [32]. Research indicates that psychiatric
healthcare professionals believe that this would be a
positive thing, in terms of the valuable “psychosocial
support” [33] that genetic counselling provides [33]. Fur-
thermore, studies indicate that should genetic testing for
psychiatric disorders become possible and widely avail-
able there would be considerable public uptake, [32, 34],
although in some cases support for such hypothetical
tests has been dependent on the extent to which theywould deliver definitive, as opposed to probable, results
[35]. While these studies indicate a hypothetical demand
for a test such as the PRS, there are potential ethical
concerns with respect to its use that warrant consider-
ation. Here, there would be a broad array of concerns
including the possibility that PRS could exacerbate exist-
ing health inequities, eugenics concerns regarding pre-
natal testing and challenges associated with testing of
minors, the possibility that such a test could entrench
stigmatising or reductive assumptions regarding mental
disorders, the potential for discriminatory use, and chal-
lenges regarding feedback and interpretation of high
polygenic risk. As most of these concerns are associated
with genetic testing in general, it is necessary to examine
their implications for the use of PRS, in particular. We
discuss four areas in which the use of PRS could have
ethical implications.
The potential exacerbation of health inequities
The majority of GWASs have been conducted in high
income countries (HICs), and, even within these con-
texts, have included mostly participants of European an-
cestry [36]. The predictive ability of PRS is therefore
much higher for these populations. The need to include
populations with non-European ancestry in these stud-
ies, and in particular, populations with African ancestry,
which are significantly underrepresented, has been noted
[36–39]. This has become even more pertinent in light
of the fact that direct-to-consumer-genetic companies
are poised to offer PRS testing for certain diseases with
predictive ability that is avowedly “race-restricted” [40].
There are several reasons that warrant greater repre-
sentation of populations of African ancestry in GWASs.
Given that humanity originated in Africa, such studies
may provide valuable insights regarding missing gaps in
our knowledge of human evolutionary history in general
[41]. In addition, genomes of African ancestry are char-
acterised by significant levels of genetic diversity and
unique genetic variants, due to patterns of migration
and admixture [39]. Studying the genomes of popula-
tions of African ancestry therefore holds major potential
for deepening our understanding of the genetic basis of
various complex diseases and traits [36]. Furthermore,
and most importantly, because PRS has the potential to
enhance clinical outcomes, the fact that its predictive
ability is limited for populations of non-European ances-
try represents an injustice. In fact it has been argued that
this constitutes the most serious ethical challenge facing
the translation of PRS into the clinical context [37].
Martin et al. have also discussed various systemic chal-
lenges that have informed the neglect of diversity in gen-
etic studies and provide suggestions to address this [36].
Initiatives such as Human Heredity and Health in Africa
(H3Africa) and Neuropsychiatric Genetics in African
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the move for greater global health equity [39].
The misinterpretation of findings and potential for stigma
and discrimination
A second concern relates to implications associated with
how PRS is currently used. In research contexts PRSs
have been calculated for a number of complex behav-
iours and traits as well as to test correlations between
traits. While there are tools that are more appropriate
for such purposes, PRSs have, for example, been used to
test genetic overlap between psychotic disorders, addic-
tion [42] and substance use [43] and even between
psychosis and creativity [44]. They have also been used
to predict alcohol use [45] and dependence [46], anti-
social behaviours [47], intelligence [48], educational at-
tainment [49] and to test correlations between genetic
risk for low educational attainment and criminal behav-
iour [50]. The main underlying concern in all these ex-
amples is the potential for misinterpretation of such
findings. In particular, the way in which this kind of
information is made more accessible to the public is cru-
cial. The dissemination of information regarding pro-
gress in health-related fields such as genetics has grown
considerably due to the ease of access to online informa-
tion. However, the process of translation frequently in-
volves simplifying or exaggerating information so as to
capture attention [51, 52]. Without the requisite nuance
in explanation and understanding, this information is
easily misinterpreted. In the case of the correlations that
are currently being tested, the concern would be that mis-
interpretations could exacerbate stigmatising assumptions
regarding mental disorders, or that this information could
be used for discriminatory purposes. While certain coun-
tries have legislation that offers protection against the
discriminatory use of genetic information, such as the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in
the United States, this is not the case in numerous other
countries. Furthermore, GINA has been criticised on ac-
count of the fact that the protection it offers is limited to
preventing discrimination in employment and health in-
surance; it does not apply to other forms of insurance,
small companies (with fewer than 15 employees), or vari-
ous other areas [53].
In terms of a concern for an increase in stigma, studies
indicate that biogenetic explanations may be associated
with “lower social acceptance” [54] in the case of certain
mental disorders or with other negative connotations
[55–58]. This may be attributable to the tendency of
biogenetic explanations to elicit various reductive, deter-
minist or essentialist interpretations. For example, where
complex behaviours are shown to have genetic determi-
nants this could result in interpretations in which the
role of genetic factors in behaviour and health isoverestimated at the expense of social determinants, a
concern that has been discussed extensively in the ethics
literature ([59–61], in particular, see [62] for a discussion
of this as it pertains to PRS specifically).
In some cases, biogenetic explanations are associated
with more tolerant attitudes towards certain behaviours
[54, 63], however, it is important to examine why this is
so. While an increase in tolerant attitudes is a positive
outcome, if tolerant attitudes are informed by the percep-
tion that biological causal attributions decrease or eradi-
cate agency in some way, this would be indicative of an
underlying deterministic assumption which may have un-
anticipated consequences. Furthermore, tolerance that is
informed by a perception of genetic causation also indi-
cates the operation of the naturalistic fallacy [60]. This re-
fers to the process of deriving normative conclusions from
natural states of affairs, or, deriving an ‘ought from an is’.
While this would be an example of an essentialist belief
that happens to be supporting a positive outcome, it is not
without risk. As pointed out by Dar-Nimrod, political sen-
timents are subject to change, and thus, favourable causal
attributions that currently act as protective mechanisms
may also change [60]. We discuss the issue of determinism
further in the next section.
PRS testing of minors and eugenics concerns regarding
prenatal testing
A third area of concern would be the use of PRS for vari-
ous forms of prenatal testing or the testing of minors. In
the latter case, parents may wish to ascertain their child’s
PRS for a particular disorder, especially when there is a
family history. There would be compelling reasons for
doing so, given strong evidence of association between
various environmental factors in childhood and adoles-
cence, and disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder and depression [64, 65]. While some of the child-
hood environmental risk factors for developing schizo-
phrenia that have been identified would be impossible for
some families to avoid (e.g. urbanicity and poverty), and
others should be prevented regardless (e.g. maltreatment
and bullying), there are certain avoidable risk factors that
increase vulnerability such as use of cannabis and stimu-
lants in adolescence [64].
The ethical permissibility of genetic testing of minors
has been addressed extensively [66] and studies have
looked at how knowledge of genetic risk affects the
self-conception of adolescents [67]. In particular, the
ethical considerations and benefits of psychiatric genetic
counselling for adolescents have also been discussed
[68]. However, it must be noted that genetic counselling
does not require genetic testing [68], therefore, ongoing
discussion and studies should focus on how psychiatric
genetic counselling for minors could be impacted by the
possibility of being accompanied by polygenic testing.
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ical issues related to the genetic testing of minors in
general, psychiatric PRS testing arguably intensifies these
concerns due to the fact that is likely that the disorders
it would mostly be used to predict risk for, would be
those with the highest heritability, such as schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder, both of which are subject to high
levels of stigmatisation [69]. Adolescents receiving feed-
back of high PRS for such disorders may be at particu-
larly high risk for internalized stigma and potentially
detrimental effects associated with negative self-labelling
[70, 71].
The potential use of PRS for various forms of prenatal
testing, including preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD), presents distinct ethical concerns. PGD has been
used for a number of decades to screen embryos created
through in vitro fertilization (IVF) for various incurable
monogenic diseases, such as cystic fibrosis, Huntington’s
disease and Tay-Sachs, and more controversially for
chromosomal disorders such as trisomy 21 (Down
syndrome) [72]. PGD has generally been regarded as
ethically preferable to prenatal testing as it avoids the
dilemma of termination of pregnancy [73]. However, a
concern with PGD is its potential to be used for
eugenics purposes [74, 75]. In this regard, PRS is now
being marketed in the commercial sector as a means of
testing embryos generated through IVF for ‘intelligence’,
through screening out those embryos at risk for mental
disorders [76]. Given the fact that PRSs can be calcu-
lated for the traits discussed above, there is major con-
cern that its marketing by direct-to-consumer-genetic
companies in this way will heighten intolerance of diver-
sity and increase stigma towards mental disorders,
permitting PRS to be used for eugenics purposes. In
addition, it must be noted that clinical genetic testing is
generally highly quality controlled – in the United States for
example, it is performed by CLIA-certified laboratories –
and is likely to be accompanied by a referral to a trained
genetic counsellor. Direct-to-consumer testing laborator-
ies have been criticised for not having the same data
quality and accuracy and for a lack of transparency regard-
ing the techniques they use [77, 78]. They may also not
have access to professionals who can assist in data inter-
pretation [79].
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on what we
consider would be the most likely and widespread appli-
cation of a clinical PRS: cases in which a consenting
adult patient has submitted to PRS testing for screening
purposes. In particular, we explore the challenges associ-
ated with feedback of high polygenic risk for developing
a psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia or bipolar
disorder. Here, there would be significant overlap with
the ethical challenges associated with the feedback of
genetic findings in general [80]. There has beenabundant research and discussion of the nature of these
challenges which include: issues of privacy and confiden-
tiality, implications for family members, the potential for
stigma, and the way in which such information is com-
municated and understood, so as to minimize psycho-
logical distress to patients [81–83].
While all of these concerns would be relevant in the
case of a clinical PRS, we argue that particular attention
should be paid to the difficulties associated with the
communication and interpretation of results. This would
be due, in part, to the fact that, given the etiological
complexity of psychiatric disorders, a PRS in the top
percentile would be an indicator of risk, not a definitive
prognosis. For this reason, nuance and skill would be re-
quired in articulating and ensuring correct understanding
(both of counsellors and patients) of ‘complex’ risk. While
the difficulties associated with feedback of complex gen-
etic risk are not necessarily unique to PRS, they neverthe-
less warrant consideration given its recency [18]. In the
final section that follows we discuss factors regarding the
interpretation of both complex risk and genetic informa-
tion that could pose challenges for PRS feedback.
Challenges of feedback of polygenic risk
The concept of risk has a variety of informal and
technical definitions. Risk is generally associated with
the possibility of some negative or undesirable event
occurring, or, as the cause attributed to a negative event.
In this common usage, risk is mostly interpreted accord-
ing to a personal or subjective framework. For example,
while most individuals know that driving poses a risk or
that there is a risk of contracting cancer, if pressed to
quantify these risks more precisely, estimates will vary
widely and generally not accord with the objective or
statistical risk concerning the phenomenon in question
[84]. In fact, studies indicate low levels of understanding
of statistical or numerical risk information not only in
the public arena [85] but also in the case of medical pro-
fessionals [86]. It is therefore likely that quantitative or
objective risk will not be interpreted in a predictable or
uniform manner. In addition, the difficulties related to the
comprehension and interpretation of genetic information
in general [87–89] as well as the challenges related to com-
municating complex genetic risk information have been
discussed extensively [90–92]. The comprehension of poly-
genic risk thus represents an intersection between various
constructs that are, understandably, easily misinterpreted
due to their complexity. However, if polygenic risk com-
munication is considered similar in kind to communication
of other risk indicators in medicine then there are numer-
ous strategies and resources that may be utilised [93].
Considering these factors is important because the aim
of communicating a high PRS for a psychiatric disorder
would be to prevent onset or mitigate severity, if
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how best to communicate a high PRS so as to facilitate
the uptake of any therapeutic recommendations or
requisite preventative measures. This challenge would be
even more pertinent in light of studies suggesting that
knowledge of personal genetic risk for various common
diseases is not necessarily associated with increases in
motivation to implement behavioural or lifestyle changes
[94–96]. However, the low levels of motivation in such
cases may be attributable to low perceptions of threat
[97]. As pointed out by Sanderson et al., protection mo-
tivation theory (PMT) predicts that if the level of threat
is perceived to be sufficiently high and amenable to re-
duction, this will increase motivation to implement
requisite behavioural changes [98]. Feedback of suffi-
ciently high polygenic risk may therefore be an effective
motivator for uptake of therapeutic recommendations.
These observations aside, it will be important to ensure
that PRS feedback is accompanied by meaningful,
evidence-based intervention recommendations. Empir-
ical studies of PRS thresholds, such as the example men-
tioned above, could be helpful in this regard.
An additional factor that warrants consideration is that
risk is a normative concept; it is used only to refer to a
possible negative event that we seek to avoid. In other
words, the notion of risk is directive; there is always
some instrumental purpose for seeking risk information
or wishing to provide it [99]. We seek risk information
so as to mitigate or eradicate this risk, if possible; how-
ever, risk, as such, is unavoidable. While there are many
risks that we can mitigate, thus giving us a sense of sub-
jective control, there will always be some level of risk
that is impervious to our control. In a medical context,
there are areas where a certain level of control can be
exercised in mitigating risk [100]. Individuals at risk for
contracting type 2 diabetes, for example, are able to
lessen this risk through behavioural modifications, such
as changing their diets, losing weight or exercising.
However, perceived subjective control over other forms
of medical risk, such as genetic risk, may be drastically
reduced because while there are interventions that can
reduce overall risk of disease outcomes, the level of gen-
etic risk itself remains relatively stable.
In the case of PRS feedback, it would be important to
ensure that information about the stable character of
complex genetic risk does not support reductive inter-
pretations. As mentioned in the previous section, such
interpretations may result in deterministic assumptions
whereby the role played by genes in health and disease is
overemphasised at the expense of the crucial role played
by environmental and non-genetic factors [101]. This
would be counter-productive to the purpose of having
communicated a high PRS. Studies of public interpreta-
tions of genetic information have produced conflictingresults that indicate the presence of both high and low
levels of genetic determinism [102]. However, determin-
istic beliefs are complex and difficult to measure [103].
In addition such beliefs are informed by contextual fac-
tors such as religiosity and various social and cultural in-
fluences, and are therefore highly variable [104, 105]. On
the one hand, an increase in public knowledge of the
role played by genetic factors in psychiatric disorders is
frequently associated with concomitant determinist and
essentialist misinterpretations [59]. Deterministic beliefs,
in turn, are frequently coterminous with a sense of fatal-
ism, decreased agency, or being ‘at the mercy of one’s
genes’ or biology [106]. On the other hand, studies also
indicate the presence of relatively neutral or balanced
causal attributions in certain groups [107, 108]. In a
study of laypersons’ understandings of health outcomes,
Condit et al. observed ‘rampant’ inconsistences in partic-
ipants’ responses [102]. They hypothesised that these
conflicting results may be attributable to the fact that in-
dividuals have internalised two distinct and dissonant
‘discourse tracks’ or ways of explaining health and dis-
ease: one of ‘genetic causation’ and one of ‘behavioural
causation’ [102]. It is presumed that these discourses are
encoded in neural networks that develop distinctly, and
thus, that they do not operate mutually. This hypothesis
has been supported by further research findings [108].
These findings have implications for the framing and
communication of PRS information as these tracks may
be stimulated by various contextual cues [102]. An ap-
propriate way forward may be to focus on interventions
that could effectively connect these two tracks rather
than attempting to ‘adjust’ them separately.
Our discussion of some of the factors that require con-
sideration in communicating polygenic risk is by no
means exhaustive. Our aim is primarily to make the case
that if PRS is ever utilised in a clinical context, research
regarding effective communication would be a prerequis-
ite in order to encourage constructive interpretation. Such
research should focus on two challenges. Firstly, how to
ensure that the relevant healthcare practitioners who
would be in a position to order PRS testing and those who
deliver PRS feedback have a clear understanding of PRS
itself. The acceptance and understanding of PRS by
healthcare professionals would be critical to its uptake
and dissemination. It would therefore be necessary to
ensure that they receive the relevant training that would
enable them to ascertain when ordering PRS testing for a
patient is warranted. Given the general shortage of genetic
counsellors, it is likely that PRS feedback would be deliv-
ered by practitioners who do not have expertise in genet-
ics. It would therefore be necessary to equip practitioners
with the relevant technical knowledge, including the po-
tential for misinterpretation, and to have a subsequent
means of assessing their comprehension.
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translate PRS findings into a more accessible format for
feedback that does not lead to misleading oversimplifica-
tions and to test the efficacy of these formulations.
There are various psychometric tools that have been de-
veloped and used to assess genetics literacy in different
contexts [103, 109, 110] as well as research that has
identified problem areas in genomics, genetics and nu-
meric literacy [111]. Further research that could adapt
these tools and findings to devise an instrument relevant
for the assessment of understanding of PRS before and
after it has been communicated would be valuable. A
recent study that assessed the comprehension of
psychiatric genomics information of patients with schi-
zophrenia and controls, found that an iterative learning
approach led to further improvements in understanding
[112]. Iterative learning is a dynamic form of learning
that takes the form of a positive feedback loop. Informa-
tion is presented and explained, after which the ‘student’
is asked to explain this information in their own words,
demonstrating their level of understanding. Problem
areas are then identified and discussed after which the
information is reiterated by the student, and so on.
While this study examined iterative learning in conjunc-
tion with a particular instrument developed to assess de-
cisional capacity for research participation,5 should a
clinical PRS become feasible, it would be worthwhile to
investigate the adaptability and efficacy of this approach.
Research indicates that the iterative approach, also
described as “tell back-collaborative inquiry” is “significantly
preferred” by patients in demonstrating their understand-
ing, in comparison with other approaches, such as yes-no
responses, to questioning [113].
While we have focused primarily on the implications
of potential clinical use of PRS for psychiatric disorders,
our discussion is relevant to clinical use of PRS for
complex (non-psychiatric) disorders in general. However,
we posit that feedback of a high PRS for a psychiatric
disorder could pose distinct challenges that warrant fur-
ther attention. For example, there is growing interest in
the way in which genetic risk is assimilated into an
individual’s “sense of self” [114] or personal identity. We
suggest that further discussion should focus on whether
the factors discussed above could intersect with stigma-
tising perceptions of mental disorders to contribute to-
wards a “negative ‘risk identity’” [115].
Furthermore, it is not only the individuals receiving
PRS feedback who could be negatively impacted, the
issue of ‘associative stigma’, whereby family members or
those with close ties to persons with psychiatric disor-
ders are subject to stigmatising ascriptions, is also a con-
cern [116] As discussed above, given that there is
evidence that biogenetic explanations are associated with
stigmatising assumptions [55, 117], there is a risk thatknowledge of the polygenic heritability of psychiatric dis-
orders could further heighten associative stigma towards
family members of persons with psychiatric disorders.
While stigmatising assumptions are not unique to psychi-
atric disorders, the stigma associated with mental disor-
ders is particularly acute and has been recognised by the
World Health Organization (WHO) as producing negative
impacts in virtually every aspect of the lives of persons liv-
ing with such disorders, including posing the most signifi-
cant obstacle to accessing treatment [118]. It is therefore
possible that if feedback of high psychiatric risk is inter-
preted through a stigmatising ‘lens’ this could further con-
found matters and negatively impact self-conception.
Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at some of the ethical im-
plications of PRS with a focus on certain challenges that
could arise in the communication and interpretation of
a high PRS. We take the identified challenges to be a
relevant component of an initial exploratory discussion
of the clinical efficacy of PRS. This is because the way in
which PRS feedback is interpreted would have direct
bearing on the uptake of any therapeutic recommenda-
tions or preventative measures. Despite the challenges
that we have discussed in this paper, we contend that in-
sofar as PRS could assist in more effectively diagnosing,
treating or, ultimately, preventing the onset of particular
psychiatric disorders, evidence-based clinical translation
would be a decidedly positive outcome.
The WHO estimates that “mental disorders [are]
among the leading causes of ill-health and disability
worldwide” [119]. More specifically, it has been esti-
mated that 7.4% of the global disease-burden is attribut-
able to mental disorders and substance use disorders
[120]. Furthermore, meta-analysis reveals that psychi-
atric disorders are among the leading causes of death;
with estimations of 14.3% (roughly 8 million) of all
deaths per annum ascribed to psychiatric disorders
[121]. Given the enormity of this burden, and the way in
which psychiatric disorders tend to negatively impact
the lives of individuals and their families, there is argu-
ably a moral obligation to inform individuals who are at
particularly high risk so that all possible pre-emptive
measures may be taken. There is also a moral obligation
to continue to further our knowledge of the aetiology of
such disorders in order to continue to improve our re-
sponses to them. However, the ethical challenges that
will continue to be elicited by the practical applications
of this knowledge will require ongoing scrutiny so as to
minimise unanticipated and anticipated harms and
maximise potential benefits. This paper serves as a point
of departure for further discussion of the ethical chal-
lenges that could arise through the potential use of clin-
ical PRSs in psychiatry.
Palk et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine            (2019) 14:4 Page 9 of 12Endnotes
1A high level of statistical power is required to avoid
false positives and false negatives [122]. An allele with a
relative risk of 0–2 is considered to be of small effect.
An allele with a relative risk lower than 1.20 requires a
sample size greater than 8000 cases (plus controls) to
ensure statistical power [123].
2SNPs which are the most common form of allelic
variation, are differences in DNA sequences.
3We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for
this suggestion and example.
4Non-additive genetic variation refers to interactions
between genes in which the effect produced is more
than the sum total of the individual contributions. This
is contrasted with additive genetic variation whereby the
contribution of both variants is simply the sum of each
variant’s effect.
5This study assessed the ability of iterative learning to
improve understanding in conjunction with the University
of California, San Diego Brief Assessment of Capacity to
Consent (UBACC). The UBACC is a tool specifically de-
signed to assess the decisional capacity of participants
who may have impairments in this regard, as well as to
improve their understanding by identifying aspects of the
research that have not been accurately understood [124].
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